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Introduction - Perceptions do matter1  
Over the last decade, the EU-Russia relations 
have witnessed a further institutionalization of the 
political dialogue and a fast expansion of trade 
exchanges, both of which cemented a greater mutual 
dependence of the partners. At the same time, the 
amount of misunderstandings in the political field and 
trade disputes have risen constantly, the normative 
gap has widened, while perspectives of building 
trust have narrowed. Explaining these controversial 
trends, a French expert accurately observed that 
“the institutionalization of the relationship has not 
institutionalized confidence between the partners” 
(Gomart 2008: 2). 
Indirectly recognizing dissatisfaction with 
the current state of bilateral affairs with the EU, an 
influential Russian law-maker noted that “more or less 
normal relations are developing perhaps only with 
China and Kazakhstan”2 (Kosachev 2009). Similarly, 
a Russian diplomat provides an optimistic outlook on 
everything but the EU: “The reset with the US seems 
working well, there are promising signals coming 
from NATO, Sino-Russian cooperation is solid as 
never before, and only political relationship with the 
EU is trailing behind these dynamics”3. After the 6th 
round of negotiations on the basic treaty between 
Russia and the EU, the former Deputy Permanent 
Representative of Russia to the EU criticized the 
slow progress and the agreements reached on few 
insignificant articles of the draft of accord (Ivanov 
2010: 138). Finally, after the EU-Russia Summits in 
Rostov-on-Don, a former Russian top government 
official draws a gloomy conclusion: “The two sides 
do not share a common agenda on economic 
cooperation, nor are they willing to do what it would 
take to bring about a substantive change in the 
situation” (Aleksashenko 2010).
The pessimistic stance on the ‘strategic 
partnership’ is echoed by the ‘EU camp’, too. The 
democratic backslide, a heavy-handed approach 
towards its neighbours and the overuse of 
protectionist measures in the economy4 are seen as 
driving Russia away from some of the core values 
1  The title inverts Robert Jervis’ question “Do 
perceptions matter?” (cf. Jervis 1976: 13). 
2  Translated from Russian by author.
3  Russian diplomat, interview by author, 21 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium.
4  In early 2009, in order to protect the autochthon 
producers, Russia has raised import tariffs which impacted 
negatively EU consumer and industrial goods exports to 
Russia. This decision also diminished Russia’s chances to 
conclude negotiations on an accession to the WTO (Lobjakas 
2009; Miller 2010).
of the European Union (Lobjakas 2009). There is a 
widely shared feeling in the EU that the economic 
crisis has not opened Russia politically and 
economically as many have expected and therefore 
the EU-Russia relationship remains anaemic.5 EU 
officials are less pessimistic about the pace and 
substance of negotiations on the new basic treaty 
with Russia. However, Russia’s credibility deficit 
raises concerns in the EU as to whether and to 
what extent Moscow will abide by the bilateral treaty 
obligations.6  
The prerequisite of a sustainable relationship 
lies in understanding what has hampered the 
development of a genuine ‘strategic partnership’ up 
to now. This question gains more relevance in the 
light of the EU’s renewed attempt to resuscitate the 
relationship with Russia through the ‘partnership 
for modernization’7 (Council of the European Union 
2010). A possible approach to identify what went 
wrong in the EU-Russia relation is to look into the 
actors’ perceptions which represent a set of images, 
views and attitudes that reflect an understanding of 
the counterpart’s intentions, internal developments, 
foreign policies and more general positioning on 
the international arena. The way actors see each 
other may smoothen or hinder political, economic 
and security cooperation. This is particularly true for 
bilateral relationships between geographically close 
neighbours. 
This paper proposes to look at the EU and its 
member states from a Russian perspective. Analysing 
Russia’s perceptions of the EU and its member 
states could prove valuable for several reasons. 
First, perceptions facilitate an understanding of the 
other’s behaviour. They help to interpret actions of 
other international players, which in turn influence 
an actor’s own responses. Deemed not to be the 
only factor responsible for a state’s behaviour, the 
analysis of perceptions could explain to some degree 
the oscillating relations between the EU and Russia 
and Russian reactions to EU policies. The empirical 
interest in perceptions is not entirely baseless as it 
matches the causal weight Russia attaches to this 
factor in international affairs (Russian President 
5  Romanian diplomat, interview by author, 19 March 
2010, Berlin, Germany. EU officials, interview by author, 20-
22 October 2009, Brussels, Belgium. For domestic reasons on 
why the economic crisis has not opened Russia politically and 
economically see Wilson (2009).
6  EU officials, interview by author, 20-22 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium. 
7  This initiative, in the short and mid term, seems 
to be a reaction to the slow progress of negotiations (which 
might last longer than expected) on the new basic treaty with 
Russia as well as a tool to support President Medvedev’s 
modernization agenda for Russia.
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2008), and in particular in the relations with the EU. 
For instance, Russia’s ambassador to the EU has 
drawn a direct link between the negative perceptions 
of Russia and the strained relations with the EU 
(Chizhov 2008). 
Second, perceptions never evolve in a 
normative vacuum. They are always contingent 
to the identity, which equips an actor with a loupe 
through which it sees and interprets things (Abdelal 
et al. 2006). The distinctive version of European-ness 
is one of the inseparable building blocks of Russian 
identity. Therefore, insight into Russia’s perceptions 
of the EU will reveal how Russia sees itself in the 
European context. But Russia’s European ambitions 
are not confined to a regional level only. Thus, 
Russia’s thinking on its place in Europe will also 
unveil aspects of its global outlook.
Third, there is a strong correlation between 
perceptions and an actor’s economic or military 
capabilities (Rousseau/Garcia-Retamero 2007). 
Rise in national power is likely to encourage self-
confidence and adjust an actor’s views in terms 
of ‘relational power’. Accumulation of the power 
resources and subsequent mutation of perceptions 
could turn major states into ‘frustrated great powers’8 
coveting for others’ recognition of their power status 
(Suzuki 2008). Hence, Russia’s most recent image 
of the EU could help establish the link between the 
cycle of uninterrupted economic growth9 Russia 
went through after rapid fall during the 1990’s, 
its perceptions of Europe and demands to be 
recognized as a distinct European pole. 
Fourth and finally, the environment 
invariably shapes an actor’s perceptions. Russia’s 
regional environment along its western border 
has transformed with the expansion of the EU, 
i.e. a process that deepened the multi-layered 
interdependence among the neighbours as well. 
A close examination of Russia’s thinking about 
the EU will help to understand how Russia sees 
interdependence, i.e. the key feature defining its 
European milieu. The potential findings on what 
Russia ‘makes of it’ (Wendt 1992: 391) could shed 
light on why the interdependence served as “a 
8 ‘Frustrated great powers’ are major states which: 
“[…] believe they have been refused social equality with other 
‘legitimate great powers’ in the course of their interactions 
with their peers […]; states that are not given the privileges 
associated with ‘legitimate great power status’, and perceive 
a mismatch between their own expectations and the actual 
‘constitutional privileges’ they are (or are not) accorded” 
(Suzuki 2008: 49). 
9 According to the World Bank’s (2009) country report, 
Russian economy grew in average by 7% between 1999-2007 
and 5.6% in 2008. In 2009 it shrunk by 7.9% (Agence France-
Presse 2010). In 2010-2011 Russia will resume the growth, 
projected by IMF to 4% and 4.3% respectively (Xinhua 2010).
source of permanent frustration” (Medvedev 2008c: 
217) rather than an impulse for cooperation between 
the EU and Russia. 
The International Relations (IR) literature 
provides a comprehensive account of how Russia’s 
perceptions of Europe and later of the EU evolved 
from the Tsarist times through the Cold War period up 
to the post-Soviet transition phase (Neumann 1996; 
Lomagin 2009; Mueller 2009; Baranovsky 2002). 
However, the main bulk of literature dedicated to the 
post-Soviet past keep track of Russia’s perceptions 
of the EU until the first half of President Putin’s 
second term in office (Lynch 2004; Allison et al. 
2006; Larsson 2006; Kaveshnikov 2007; Anderman 
et al. 2007). The notable exceptions that stretch 
beyond this time frame are several sectoral analyses 
tackling Russia’s attitudes towards the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue or the EU’s energy diversification strategy 
(Haukkala 2008a; Haukkala 2009; Stewart 2009; 
Romanova 2008; Feklyunina 2008; Barysch 2008). 
Perceptions often mutate under the impact 
of domestic and international factors. This paper 
intends to further research in this field by providing 
the latest integrated picture of Russia’s perceptions 
of the EU (covering 2007-2010). In doing so, it seeks 
to absorb into the analysis the implications of the 
global financial crisis, the EU’s institutional reform, 
the short war in the South Caucasus, the Russian-
Ukrainian gas crisis (2009), the launch of the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP), and bilateral dynamics between 
Russia and the EU member states. There is no 
shortage of studies assessing the EU member states’ 
approaches to Russia (Leonard/Popescu 2007; Rahr 
2007; Gomart 2007; Dura 2008; Braghiroli/Carta 
2009; Hagstrom Frisel/Oldberg 2009). On the other 
hand, with few exceptions (Guseinov/Monaghan 
2009; Leonard/Popescu 2007) little attention has 
been paid to Russian perspectives on bilateralism 
with the EU member states. The paper proposes to 
fill this gap.
Despite an extremely centralized political 
system, the Russian state is not a monolithic block. 
There is a plurality of opinions about the EU in Russia. 
This research has no purpose to cover the entire 
mosaic of Russia’s perceptions of Europe. Instead 
it aims to unveil and interpret Russia’s mainstream 
perceptions, which are widely shared across the 
political and expert community spectrum and thus 
influence Russia’s behavior towards the EU. 
This study argues that Russia’s mainstream 
perceptions of the European integration project 
are multilayered and often contradictory. As the 
analysis will show, these are very much the product 
of a deeply engrained ‘great power identity’, political 
and economic developments in Russia during 
the last decade as well as conclusions Russian 
governing elites reached about the direction of the 
global power shift and the nature of transatlantic 
divergences (Chapter 1). The study also claims that 
the mainstream perceptions of Europe’s energy 
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and neighbourhood strategies breed unsustainable 
ambitions and policies, fomenting mistrust and 
frictions in EU-Russia relations (Chapter 2). This 
very same dynamic can be proved for Russian 
attitudes towards bilateral relations with EU member 
states (Chapter 3). 
To prove the three levels of the above 
explained hypothesis, the study will follow a 
respective three-level approach. The first chapter 
will focus on how Russia perceives the EU’s internal 
developments and Europe’s performance as a foreign 
and security actor with a particular emphasis on 
relations with Russia and thus prove, whether these 
perceptions are multilayered and often contradictory. 
The second chapter will cover sectoral issues, 
depicting Russian perceptions of and reactions to 
EU policies in fields where interdependence has 
deepened over the last decade, such as energy and 
the ‘common neighbourhood’. Since the bilateral 
track plays a significant role in Russia’s European 
strategy, the third chapter will explore Russia’s 
perceptions of the EU member states. Both the 
second and the third chapter are to prove whether 
unsustainable ambitions and policies are increasing 
mistrust and frictions in EU-Russia relations. The 
paper will conclude by summarising the main findings 
and implications for the EU’s strategy on Russia. 
To reveal Russia’s perceptions, the paper 
will make use of Russian official documents, and 
declarations, articles and press interviews; reports 
produced by think-tanks close to power; leading 
experts’ analyses; and interviews with Russian 
diplomats and experts, as well as European officials 
and analysts, condcuted by the author.
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1. Russian perspectives on the EU’s 
integration project: internal and external 
dimension
Russia’s perceptions operate with several images 
that portray the EU both in a positive and a negative 
light. This chapter will focus on how Russia sees the 
EU’s integration project at its current stage, looking 
at both the internal and external dimension. 
1.1. Internal dimension
 
Economic giant in trouble
Moscow sees the EU as domestically engulfed 
by multiple problems. The EU struggles hard to 
economically absorb the poor newcomers. Russia 
finds this task particularly challenging in conditions 
of the current global economic crisis. In fact, 
Moscow perceives the economic troubles of the 
Eastern member states as an irritant factor for the 
‘old Europe,’ that widens cleavages within the EU 
(Yurieva 2009; Vlasova 2009). Squabbles between 
the Eurozone major members on the rescue package 
for Greece have shown that fissures transcend the 
conventional East-West divide and affect also the 
core of Europe. Thus, the EU’s delayed response 
to Greece’s financial crisis served to discredit the 
Union’s reputation in Russian eyes (Bordachev 
2010: 8). Despite anti-crisis aid, the EU provided 
to affected economies, the Kremlin does not rule 
out the possibility of an EU dissolution if ‘endless 
solidarity and assistance […] gives no result’ 
(Medvedev 2010a). Russia regards the wakened 
‘appetite’ for protectionist measures in the EU as 
an additional dividing issue that could seriously test 
the internal market fundamentals with far-reaching 
consequences for the future European integration 
(Yurgens 2008: 9). 
On the institutional level, Russia thinks 
that the enlargement has undermined EU 
cohesion, contributed largely to the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty10 and made the process of the 
Lisbon Treaty ratification more painful. The failure to 
promptly carry out the institutional reforms froze the 
integration project and diminished the efficiency of 
the EU’s supranational bodies. As the Head of the 
Russian Duma Foreign Affairs Committee noted on 
the repercussion of enlargement on governance “[…] 
in the rush for quantitative expansion […] Europe 
has lost out in terms of quality” (Kosachev 2008: 51). 
Due to frequent institutional blockages and the lack 
10  Referendums in France and the Netherlands held in 
May and June 2005 respectively put the end to the ratification 
process.
of a clear perspective on the way forward, Russia 
believes that the EU is unable to set strategic goals 
and therefore is forced to focus on rather insignificant 
and less controversial issues (Yurgens 2008: 9). 
While the Lisbon Treaty implementation could ease 
some of the EU’s institutional problems, there is a 
certain degree of pessimism in Russia whether 
the reform will pave the way for a more unified EU, 
being able to deal with urgent domestic tasks in an 
expedient manner (Kuznetsova 2009a). 
The economic and institutional difficulties 
cited above have implications for Russia’s perception 
of the EU in the international system. Moscow’s 
assessment presents the EU as falling behind its 
main competitors in the race for building a ‘knowledge 
based economy’. Russia believes that the EU has 
reduced its chances to compete successfully in 
the high-tech areas with the United States (US) 
and Japan due to a weak implementation of the 
Lisbon Agenda, inferior spending for research and 
development activities and a weak coordination of 
funds designated for innovation projects (Bordachev 
2007: 114-115; Yurgens 2008: 10). The EU’s troubles 
during the economic crisis and BRIC members’ (i.e. 
Brazil, Russia, India and China) robust growth have 
served as an additional proof for the Kremlin that 
the gravity centre of economic and political power 
is gradually moving away from the Atlantic shores 
towards Asia (Rogov 2010). This explains the 
Russian government’s energetic efforts to beef up 
economic and diplomatic ties with its main partners 
in Asia. 
Intrusive commercial power
Apart from systemic calculations, Russia’s interest in 
Asia is geared up by its concern with overdependence 
on trade relations with the EU. According to the 2008 
statistics, the EU share in the Russian trade turnover 
reached 52.3% (European Commission 2009), 
confirming the EU’s status as Russia’s leading 
commercial partner. However, with a total turnover of 
9.7% (Directorate General for Trade 2009) Russia’s 
place in EU trade is rather modest.11 Although this 
issue has never been brought up in public, the 
Russian leadership perceives the unbalanced 
distribution of trade as a creeping ‘soft threat’ for 
its sovereignty. Heavy reliance on the European 
market provides the EU, in Russian mind, with 
strong economic levers vis-à-vis Russia jeopardizing 
ultimately its international autonomy. Moscow also 
fears the possibility that the EU imposes elements of 
the acquis communautaire on the country, “turning 
11  68% of Russian exports to the EU in 2008 represent 
energy and mineral fuels. Russia also exports manufactured 
goods, chemicals and raw materials. For more, see Directorate 
General for Trade (2009). 
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Russia into a normative colony of the EU”.12 In this 
regard, a Russian career diplomat remarks with 
suspicion that the Lisbon Treaty maintains the EU’s 
messianic mission to project its values inside partner 
states which is seen to have direct implications for 
Russia (Ivanov 2010: 139). De-sovereignization 
anxiety is indirectly reflected in Russia’s long-term 
development strategy, which among other guiding 
principles mentions the “geographical diversification 
of external economic links” (Russian Government 
2008a). 
Thus, the perception of an imminent 
power shift superposed with Russia’s normative 
drive for greater autonomy on the international 
arena encourages Moscow to diversify its external 
economic ties. In search for a multi-vectoral trade 
interdependence, Russia identifies China and India 
as the most lucrative markets, which would help to 
counter-balance the intense commercial exchanges 
with Europe (Russian Government 2008a). Russia 
hopes that the implemented diversification strategy 
will help foster equal and value-free relations with 
the West. The Agreement on Cooperation between 
Russia and China through 2018 and a large 
package of contracts concluded with China (worth 
€2.4 bn) and India (worth €2.9 bn) in 2009 signify 
the determination to recalibrate Russia’s foreign 
economic policy. In the long-term perspective, 
Russian experts even anticipate a gradual decline 
of commercial volumes exchange with the EU as a 
result of Russia’s reorientation to Asia (Bordachev 
2007: 117).
Attractive economic partner
Nevertheless and in spite of the grim assessment 
of the EU’s performance during the crisis and 
propensity to multi-vectoral economic ties, the EU 
will remain an attractive economic partner for Russia 
in the foreseeable future. In the end, diversification 
does not mean seclusion from Europe, which is to 
play a vital role in Russia’s ‘managed modernization’ 
guided by the state. The concept of socio-economic 
development of Russia until 2020 predicts that “the 
EU member states will preserve the leading positions 
in the geographical structure of Russian exports and 
imports, and also will be the most important source of 
investments, technologies and business competence 
in high-tech sectors of Russian economy”13 (Russian 
Government 2008a).
Although Russia plunged in the economic 
crisis with a strong ‘psychology of rising power’ 
(Russian President 2008), its leadership is fully 
12  Danila Bochkarev, political analyst, interview by 
author, 19 October 2009, Brussels, Belgium.
13  Translated from Russian by author.
aware of the structural vulnerabilities of the Russian 
economy (Medvedev 2009a). The need to diversify 
the economy and ignite an intensive development 
explains Russia’s approach towards the EU as 
a source of long-term credits and technological 
transfers. In parallel, the Kremlin assumes that 
interaction with the EU on its own terms will help 
to consolidate its grip on power rather than open 
the way for political liberalization. According to the 
Presidential First Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav 
Surkov “the more money, knowledge and technology 
we can get from the advanced countries the stronger 
and more sovereign our democracy will be” (quoted 
in Shevtsova 2009).
Statistics show that almost 75% of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in Russia come from the EU 
member states (European Commission 2009). Yet, 
it is worth mentioning that, while the EU is seen as 
a major source of credits and investments, Russia 
explores alternative options to finance its long-term 
projects. In 2009, China provided the oil company 
Rosneft, the oil-pipeline monopoly Transneft and 
Russian banks (among which Vneshtorgbank) with 
$15 bn, $ 10 bn and approximately $1.7 bn in loans, 
respectively. There is an observable trend among 
Russian companies (close to state power) to use 
Asian financial gates (Hong Kong stock exchange) 
to attract investments.
The issue of technological exchanges also 
displays certain peculiarities. Although Russia 
voiced criticism on the implementation of the Lisbon 
Agenda, the government expressed interest in joining 
the EU’s 7th Framework Programme for research 
and technological development for 2007-2013 as 
an associate member and engage in joint innovative 
projects (Russian Government 2008b). Moreover, 
Russia’s cooperation in this field is not confined to 
the civil sector. The imperatives to modernize its 
armed forces and the dire situation of the defence 
industry push Russia to seek military technology 
transfers. For instance, top Russian military official 
declared that the European partners’ willing to sell 
a helicopter carrier for the Russian navy will have 
to share the vessel’s construction technology 
(Kommersant 2009). 
Confident that the reserves accumulated 
during the last decade would help overpass the 
economic turbulences, Russia regards the economic 
crisis as an opportunity to expand its presence on the 
European market. The Central and East Europeans, 
i.e. those hit the hardest by the crisis, are targeted 
with predilection (Secrieru 2009: 6-7). However, 
investments are restricted neither geographically 
to former satellites nor sectorally to the traditional 
energy industry. Some Russian acquisitions pursue 
a modernization agenda eyeing the access to 
industrial technologies. The attempted takeover of 
Opel by Magna and Sberbank consortium is the most 
glaring example of this. But Russia is not only a high-
tech hunter. It also seeks to make profits in Europe 
from its own advanced technologies, like those in 
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the nuclear industry or civil aircraft construction. 
Moscow foresees new openings on the European 
nuclear market, as the EU member states will strive 
to abide more to a renewable and clean energy 
agenda (Kramer 2010). 
European Integration as a model to emulate in the 
post-Soviet space14
Moving beyond a profit driven agenda, the EU bears 
an impact on Russia’s strategies and discourse in the 
post-Soviet space. Looking through a longue durée 
lens, Russia perceives the European integration 
project as a success story that brought peace 
and prosperity to the continent, which was until 
then torn apart by wars (Karaganov 2009). Thus, 
Moscow considers the European integration project 
very useful for the reconstruction of its sphere of 
influence by presenting advantages of the economic 
cooperation in the CIS framework and playing the 
role of economic integration engine in the ‘near 
abroad’. One of the Russian top diplomats regards 
the EU as an example for regional integration and 
urges to make use of the rich European experience 
in the CIS space (Chizhov 2010). Behind the EU’s 
debt crisis that is expected to deflect EU’s attention 
from the Eastern neighbourhood, Russia detects 
‘a geopolitical opportunity […] to push for an 
economically viable form of integration in the former 
Soviet space’ (Frolov 2010). The Kremlin believes that 
a ‘simulation’ of European integration ‘technologies’ 
in the post-Soviet space will help portray Russia as 
a benign power in the ‘near abroad’.
Russia’s multilateral pseudo-integration 
initiatives in the economic field can be seen as 
inspired by the EU example. During the opening 
ceremony of the Customs Union (with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan) the Russian President explained using 
EU jargon that ‘this really will result in a completely 
new freedom of movement of goods, services, 
capital and labor,’15 a process which, as Moscow 
hopes, other fellow post-Soviet republics will adhere 
as well (Medvedev 2009b). In his plea for deeper 
economic integration with Kazakhstan and Belarus, 
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov argued for the 
introduction of a common currency, taking the Euro 
as an example (Halpin 2010). Addressing issues of 
various economic integration formats in the post-
Soviet space under the auspices of the CIS, the 
former director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence 
Service and current Executive Secretary of the 
14  This section will not deal with Russia’s perception 
of the EaP which will be treated in the second chapter. It will 
tackle the impact of the EU integration model on Russia’s 
policy style and institutional projects in the CIS.
15  Translated from Russian by author.
CIS Sergei Lebedev compared this situation to the 
EU’s multispeed and multilevel integration providing 
examples of the Monetary Union and the Schengen 
space. Finally, Russian officials sound upbeat about 
the success of the integration projects in the ‘near 
abroad’, hoping to advance faster than the EU during 
its 50-years history (Lebedev 2010). 
1.2 External dimension
Underdeveloped hard power
Assessing the EU’s external actorness, Russian 
experts see a major discrepancy between its 
economic potential and the real political force 
(Lukyanov 2009a: 4). Moscow believes that the EU 
– despite having ambitious goals – has not been 
successful in building a coherent common foreign 
policy and strong military pillar that would elevate it 
to the status of an autonomous international player.16
The EU’s underinvestment in independent 
hard power instruments is the very fact that makes 
it rely on other actors in the security field. The EU’s 
caution to engage Russia in the development of its 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and 
the preference for a NATO-based security system 
further undermined the chances for a genuinely 
independent17 security and defence policy of the EU 
in Russian eyes (Yurgens 2008: 14-15). In technical 
terms, the lack of the EU’s autonomy is particularly 
evident for Moscow in the area of airlift capabilities. 
When the EU makes some efforts to build elements 
of own defence identity, Moscow sees no success 
without Russia’s technological input. For instance, 
Russian experts assert that without Soyuz rockets 
launches the EU could not develop the global 
navigation system Galileo, which will have military 
applications as well (Ivanov 2010: 143).  
Despite an increased number of CSDP 
missions, the EU mostly avoided risky operations, 
deploying predominantly civil or civil-military 
missions. Hence, Russia regards the EU’s military 
arm as a peacekeeping rather than a fighting 
force (Bordachev 2007: 115). Although European 
peacekeeping contingents have rapidly expended 
over the last years, the resources allocated for 
their maintenance and training are regarded 
insufficient (Ivanov 2010: 143). Moscow expects 
little improvement as the economic crisis will make 
Europeans even more reticent to commit additional 
16  Russian diplomat, interview by author, 21 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium.
17  In the Russian interpretation, a genuinely 
independent CSDP is the one uncontrolled by the US/NATO 
and which does not exclude close cooperation with Russia.
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resources to defence spending. Moscow believes that 
disregard for rough power substantially diminishes 
the EU’s prospect to increase its influence in the 
international system, particularly in hard security 
matters (Yurgens 2008:14-15).
Still underdeveloped, the EU’s independent 
defence pillar subscribes to Russian interests to 
weaken NATO-centrism in Europe and forge a 
new security architecture. After a failed attempt to 
shape CSDP from inside18, Moscow believes that 
there are more chances to strengthen it through 
practical cooperation (Yurgens et al. 2009: 26-28). 
Russia’s contribution to the EU operation in Chad 
followed this logic. More than that, cooperation with 
the EU in this field provides a chance for Russia to 
prove its ‘positive’ global security potential as well 
as to observe and learn from relevant partners’ 
experience. 
Nonetheless, the ‘half-born’ CSDP is also 
perceived as a challenge for Russia’s interests in 
the post-Soviet space, especially in the conflict 
ridden areas. Russian diplomacy’s negative reaction 
to the proposal to internationalize the Russian-led 
peacekeeping operation in Transnistria through 
greater EU involvement, made by the Dutch OSCE 
chairmanship-in-office, is illustrative in this sense. 
Although exceptional circumstances have forced the 
Kremlin to accept an EU monitoring mission (EUMM) 
in Georgia, it did so to limit both the US and NATO 
influence. At the same time, to preserve control 
on the ground and weaken the EU’s hand, Russia 
blocked EUMM access to breakaway republics via 
its protectorates in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 
Incoherent foreign policy player
Another aspect that is seen as hindering the EU’s rise 
to a global power rank is represented by its internal 
divisions and deficient foreign policy decision-making 
mechanism (Bordachev 2010: 7). The enlargement 
is once more considered as having a negative effect 
on the EU (Lukyanov 2009b: 57). The accession 
of some staunch transatlantic sympathizers, in 
Moscow’s opinion complicated the internal process, 
constraining the EU’s ability to reach a consensus 
and formulate a coherent foreign and security policy. 
As a result, Russia believes that member states are 
forced to achieve the ‘lowest common denominator’ 
in order to adopt a decision. This, in turn, is seen 
as undermining the EU’s international credibility 
and has reduced its capacity to promote ambitious 
foreign policy goals (Yurgens 2008: 13-15). 
18  In the aftermath of the EU-Russia summit in Paris 
(2000), the Russian government has presented proposals on 
EU-Russia cooperation in the field of security and defence 
policy which among other points mentioned common decision-
making. For more, see Rontoyanni (2002) and Lynch (2004). 
As a Russian diplomat confessed “we 
thought that the Constitutional treaty will give birth to 
an absolutely new and powerful international actor; 
however, when the process of ratification stalled 
we understood that the EU will remain just another 
inter-governmental organization where states 
struggle to advance own interests.”19 Although the 
rejected Constitution for Europe has been replaced 
by the Lisbon Treaty, Russia remains sceptical 
about whether the new document could make the 
EU a more coherent foreign policy actor (Lukyanov 
2009a: 4). While it is unclear how the EU’s foreign 
policy apparatus will work in the new institutional 
setting, Moscow expects various groups of states 
inside the EU to continue pushing for diverse foreign 
policy initiatives preserving the EU’s inconsistency 
in foreign policy matters (Busygina/Filippov 2010: 
128). 
The reasons given above led Russian 
political elites to the conclusion that “the EU cannot be 
viewed as a significant player in the world’s political 
and especially military-political area” (Karaganov et 
al. 2009: 6). Looking into the future, Russia assumes 
that “the global influence of the EU in the medium 
term may not increase, but perhaps even weaken”20 
(Yurgens 2008: 15). More categorical voices in 
Moscow already sense that “Europe is losing its 
global significance and is turning into a secondary 
player, mired down by its own internal problems” 
(Lykyanov 2010). 
Mediator of conflicts and ‘ecological powerhouse’
In spite of major handicaps in erecting a hard power 
base or improving decision-making mechanisms, 
Russia still regards the EU as a competitive 
international player in several areas. Moscow 
recognizes the important role the EU plays in the 
mediation of conflicts (Yurgens 2008: 15). This 
dimension of external action renders a selective 
regional influence on security dossiers, such as 
Iran’s nuclear programme, the Middle East peace 
process and, lately, Georgia. Moscow views the 
peace broker facet of the EU’s foreign policy 
positively. Nevertheless, the success of the EU’s 
diplomatic missions is contingent on the involvement 
of the so-called ‘big three’, i.e. the UK, France and 
Germany. For instance, Russia tends to see the 
French presidency of the EU as an important factor 
behind the success of the EU mediation of cease-fire 
in Georgia (Medvedev 2008a). On the other hand, 
Russia deemed the EU performance during the 2009 
gas standoff, which has coincided with the Czech 
19  Russian diplomat, interview by author, 21 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium.
20  Translated from Russian by author.
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presidency of the EU, as unhelpful (Associated 
Press 2009). 
Another area where Moscow sees EU 
attempts to boost its clout is the environmental 
policy. Russia perceives the EU’s global initiatives 
in setting high standards in environmental protection 
as a bid for an ‘ecological superpower’ status. But 
Russia anticipates that the EU’s clean environment 
ambitions could generate some problems in relation 
with its foreign commercial partners and negatively 
influence the dynamics of its own economic growth 
(Yurgens 2008: 12-13). Russia foresees that climate 
change will figure high on the global agenda of great 
powers fomenting acerb competition in this field. 
Tensioned negotiations behind the doors during the 
Copenhagen summit seem to confirm this outlook 
(Rapp et al. 2010). However, recently the EU’s 
‘ecological power image’ has been shattered. Russia 
regards the EU’s failure in Copenhagen as the most 
recent example of “Europe’s inability to convert its 
cumulative economic and cultural weight into political 
influence”21 (Karaganov 2010). 
Magnet for the post-Soviet states22
‘Soft power’ is regarded by Moscow as the most 
efficient instrument of the EU’s foreign policy toolkit. 
The attractiveness of its political and economic 
model of development provides the EU with a greater 
influence in its neighbourhood (Bordachev 2007: 
114). There are voices in the Russian mainstream 
claiming that as a result of the Greek debt crisis ‘the 
gravitational pull of the EU is abating’ (Frolov 2010). 
Nevertheless, infiltration over the last years of EU’s 
‘soft power’ in the ‘common neighbourhood’ had and 
still has a direct impact on Russia’s policy in the ‘near 
abroad’. 
The EU’s enlargement and the ‘colour 
revolutions’ compelled Russia to seek a plausible 
explanation “for the purpose of its [i.e. the Russian] 
presence in the post-Soviet Union”23 (Kosachev 
2004). Thus, in an attempt to counter the ‘seductive 
pull’ of the EU in the eastern neighbourhood Russia 
has devoted substantial resources to cultivate its 
own ‘soft power’ in the ‘near abroad’ by promoting 
in alternative ideology (centred on the ‘sovereign 
democracy’ concept), investing in loyal civil society 
in the post-Soviet states and articulating a discourse 
which depicts Russia as a legitimate actor in the 
region (Popescu 2006). Russia sincerely recognized 
21  Translated from Russian by author.
22  This section will not deal with Russia’s perception 
of the EaP which will be treated in the second chapter. It will 
tackle the impact of the EU’s soft-power appeal on Russia’s 
efforts to build an own soft-power base in the CIS.
23  Translated from Russian by author.
that, by setting its own network of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) in the post-Soviet states, it 
follows the example displayed by the EU and the 
US.24 Legitimizing its leading role in the post-Soviet 
space, Russia refutes the existence of the hidden 
domination agenda. To prove Russia’s benignity in 
the ‘near abroad’, Foreign Minister Lavrov explained: 
“To us, the CIS space is not a ‘chessboard’ for playing 
geopolitical games. This is a common civilizational 
area for every people living here, one that keeps our 
historic and spiritual legacy alive” (Lavrov 2008). 
Normative Empire25
While igniting a gravitational pull in the neighbourhood, 
the EU’s ‘soft power’ is less appealing to the Russian 
leadership. Russia’s ‘sovereign choice’ does not 
imply full membership or any form of association 
with the EU (Putin 2007a). Such stance from the 
very beginning deprives the ‘normative power’ of its 
persuasion and consequently reduces the potential 
of the EU’s transformative effect. On the symbolical 
level, Moscow rejects the expropriation by the EU of 
the term ‘Europe’ and does not see any dichotomy 
between Russia and Europe (The Economist 2010; 
Chizhov 2009). Russia regards itself as a distinctive 
part of Europe which does not look necessarily like 
the EU on the inside. Hence, rather than seeking to 
merge with the EU, Moscow demands recognition of 
its own European-ness.
The struggle for peculiar European-ness 
makes Moscow challenge the premises of what is 
seen as the EU’s paradigm of ‘hierarchical inclusion’ 
(Prozorov 2009) under which Russia is supposed 
to unilaterally assimilate EU norms and practices 
without participating in any norm-making processes. 
This stance is best reflected in the observation of an 
influential Russian thinker: ‘[…] the Europeans would 
prefer a moderated and truncated version of Russia 
that has been specially designed to be manageable 
by them’ (Pavlovsky 2009: 76). From the Russian 
perspective the nature of EU-Russia relationship 
has changed fundamentally. According to a Russian 
diplomat “it is not the all-knowing EU playing God 
and descending to earth to modernize the savages” 
(quoted in Belton/Buckley 2010). It implies that the EU 
has plenty problems to deal with on its own and is not 
in a position to lecture others. Moscow rediscovered 
24  Remarks by a Russian diplomat, Seminar “EU 
& Russia in the Common Neighbourhood: Competition or 
Cooperation”, October 23 2009, Brussels, Belgium.
25  The EU has been defined as ‘normative empire’ 
because “its claim to enforce its norms beyond its own frontiers 
[…]; the spread of these [European] standards is increasingly 
based on a balance of power rather than genuinely mutual 
consent […]; regulations are both fixed and coercive […]”. 
(Laidi 2008: 1).
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the discursive attack, extensively used during the 
Cold War (e.g. on the violation of the civil rights of 
African-Americans), as one of the recipes against 
the EU’s normative hegemony. Thus, in response 
to EU’s criticism, Russia often invokes allegedly 
unsolved human rights problems in the new EU 
member states or fret about discriminatory treatment 
of Russian investors in Europe (RIA Novosti 2007; 
Bindman 2010). 
Divided partner
Russia is ready to deal with the EU provided that 
two conditions are met: (1) the EU refrains from 
a demandeur approach in the future; and (2) the 
relation is based on jointly agreed rules.26 However, 
a sustainable cooperation under this formula is 
unfeasible unless the EU overcomes its internal 
divisions on Russia.27 Moscow sees the formulation 
of the EU policy on Russia as a never-ending struggle 
between those who push for containment of Russia 
and those who oppose such a strategy (Lavrov 2007), 
with neutrals sandwiched in the middle. The result of 
this tag war is the lack of a common EU approach on 
Russia (Lukyanov 2009c). 
Meanwhile, as the EU failed on many 
occasions to build an internal consensus on Russia, 
the Kremlin sought ‘refuge’ in bilateral dialogues 
with European partners, which proved to be more 
rewarding (Baranovsky 2008: 7; Ivanov 2010). There 
are expectations in Moscow that the economic crisis 
will weaken the ‘anti-Russian’ wing inside the EU, 
located partially in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This in turn could lift some obstacles in the bilateral 
relations and help the EU to speak with one voice 
on Russia, opening fresh avenues in the EU-Russia 
dialogue (Melvil 2009: 65); but not every European 
‘single voice’ suites Russia’s interest.
As practice has shown, the EU’s common 
position on Russia has not always been received 
well in Moscow. Often, the EU’s solidarity, which 
facilitated a joint approach, has been perceived by 
the Kremlin as running against Russian interests 
(Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008). Referring 
to the impact of the EU’s principle of solidarity on 
Russian relations with Europe, President Medvedev 
recognized that “things would probably be simpler for 
us without it” (Medvedev 2008b). Although Russian 
basic documents stress the interest for more unity in 
the EU (Russian President 2008), when it has been 
reached on particular issues related to Russia, the 
EU was blamed for “recurring inertia of block-based 
policies and ideological dogmas inherited from the 
26  Russian diplomat, interview by author, 21 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium.
27  Russian diplomat, interview by author, 21 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium.
times of the Cold War” (NewEurope 2008).
Moscow conceives the EU’s Russian-friendly 
unity differently. Inserting Moscow’s relationship with 
Europe in the ‘Russia-US-EU’ triangle, a career 
diplomat and Deputy Head of the Russian Duma 
Foreign Affairs Committee outlined the most desirable 
version of the EU’s unity: “We would prefer to deal with 
a more feeble European Union, however strong and 
united enough to create some kind of counter-balance 
and able to oppose the US on important issues. 
At the same time, [we would like to have] a weak 
enough EU which could not do this without Russia’s 
help. This would be an ideal situation which would 
enable us, first, to cooperate with the EU; second, to 
exercise effective influence on its policy”28 (Kvitsinsky 
2009). Explaining why the EU has to cooperate closer 
with Russia today, Moscow invokes the greater focus 
of the US on Asia, a move which in turn diminishes 
Europe’s importance in the US foreign policy thinking 
(Karaganov et al. 2010: 5,16). According to this line 
of thought, the EU could stay in the global game by 
working closely with Russia. Thus, Moscow sees 
itself as a player, which boosts the EU’s international 
weight, predominantly via cooperation with Europe’s 
major states (Yurgens 2008: 15). This ‘great powers 
bilateralism’ in turn should lay foundations for the 
EU’s common position towards Russia ‘formulated 
on the basis of more advanced views existing in the 
European Union towards the partnership with Russia 
rather than being the least common denominator of 
the 27 member states’ (Chizhov 2007). 
This chapter has shown that Russia’s 
mainstream perceptions encompass multiple 
and often conflicting images of the EU, which in 
turn generate contradictory aspirations. It has 
demonstrated that Russia wants to be – and sees 
itself as – a part of Europe, however, the way 
Moscow understands European-ness places it apart 
from Europe the way the EU understands it. Russia 
wants a strong EU to act as a soft counter-balancer 
to the US. However, Moscow works to weaken the 
European unity to be able to influence its course. 
Russia decries the EU’s lack of military autonomy, 
but at the same time, the Kremlin is concerned 
with side effects of CSDP development in the ‘near 
abroad’. Moscow wants to trade with Europe, but 
also struggles to limit the unintended consequences 
of interdependence on its political autonomy. Russia 
wants the EU’s investments and technologies, 
but these are supposed to serve, in essence, an 
authoritarian rather than a liberal agenda. Russia 
follows a shallow imitation of EU’s post-modern 
integration technologies in the post-Soviet space, but 
the objectives it aims to accomplish remain ‘modern’, 
inter alia through the strong focus on bilateral relations 
and the use of coercion.
28  Translated from Russian by author.
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2. Russian perspectives on EU’s policies: 
energy and the Eastern Partnership
This chapter intends to examine Russia’s 
perceptions of EU policies in fields considered to be 
of mutual interest both economically and in terms of 
security. Thus, it will tackle Russia’s perceptions of 
and reactions to the EU’s gas policy and the ENP’s 
eastern dimension. 
2.1 Looking for redemption from Russian gas 
over-dependence
 
Energy as foreign policy instrument
The Russian-Ukrainian disputes and the successive 
interruptions of gas flows raised the problem of 
securitization of the gas deliveries to the EU. In order 
to strengthen its energy security, the EU, among 
other measures, intensified its search for alternative 
sources, revamped efforts to diversify the routes of 
transportation, promoted legislation supposed to 
create favourable conditions on the internal market 
through its liberalization, and repeatedly invited 
Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). 
On the other hand, Russia attaches high 
value to its energy resources as a means for 
promoting foreign policy goals. The Energy Strategy 
of the Russian Federation until 2020 underlines the 
strong linkage between how the country positions 
itself on the energy markets and its geopolitical 
influence on the international stage (Russian Ministry 
of Energy 2003). In a retrospective evaluation, 
Russia’s National Security Strategy states that 
pragmatic utilization of natural resources enhanced 
Russia’s opportunities to boost its influence in the 
world (Russian President 2009a). Since Moscow 
openly recognizes that energy resources serve as 
a useful tool to advance its foreign policy ambitions, 
Russia interpreted the EU’s gas strategy as a 
challenge to its positions in the post-Soviet space 
and an attempt to switch the regional balance 
in the energy relations in the EU’s favour. In turn, 
Russia tried to prove the “counter-productiveness 
of attempts to solve questions of European energy 
security without Russian participation” (Agence 
France-Presse 2009). Russia acted to obstruct the 
EU’s gas policy by promoting concurrent pipeline 
projects, discouraging gas producers in the Black-
Caspian Sea region from joining EU-backed energy 
projects and proposing norms which would grant the 
‘security of (gas) demand’.  
Trans-Caspian pipeline and Central Asian gas
The EU’s inroads in Central Asia caused concern in 
Moscow for two reasons. If built, the trans-Caspian 
pipeline (between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan) 
would liquidate Russia’s gas export quasi-monopoly. 
Furthermore, if the EU managed to find available 
volumes for the planned pipeline, Russia’s gas 
imports from Central Asia – which help Gazprom 
meeting its European obligations (A. Medvedev 2010) 
especially during the peak of energy consumption – 
could significantly decrease. Such a scenario would 
go against the stated goal of keeping control over 
the gas inflows from Central Asia (Russian Ministry 
of Energy 2003).
Moscow questioned the rationales of the 
project, arguing that Russia is delivering Caspian 
gas to Europe, thus there would be no need for 
the new routes (Najibullah 2009). Russia has also 
invoked environmental concerns and the unsettled 
status of the Caspian Sea linking any progress on 
the trans-Caspian pipeline with its final settlement 
(Blagov 2006). In 2008 the Kremlin acted pre-
emptively to absorb all the available volumes from 
the Central Asian republics by significantly hiking the 
price of imported gas, advanced projects to upgrade 
the existing gas transportation network and tried to 
convince Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
to build a new pipeline along the Caspian coast. 
According to experts, Gazprom’s contracts with the 
Central Asian gas producers are not cost-effective, a 
fact which demonstrates the prevalence of political 
objectives over the profit agenda of the Russian 
state monopoly (EurasiaNet 2009). This can also be 
accounted for the Kharkiv Agreement with Ukraine, 
which trades cheap Russian gas for the right to keep 
a military base in Crimea beyond 2017 (Medvedev 
2010b), thus confirming Moscow’s primacy of 
geopolitical calculations over commercial ones.
Nabucco
Backed by the EU, the Nabucco project has been 
openly declared by Russia as a competitor of the 
South Stream pipeline planned to be built on the 
Black Sea bed stretching from its western coast 
further to Europe (Putin 2009a). Conceived to ease 
the dependence of the most vulnerable member 
states on South-Eastern Europe, Nabucco is 
viewed as a threat to Russian positions in the region 
where Gazprom, according to the governmental 
strategy, is set to increase its market share (Russian 
Ministry of Energy 2003). Moreover, its successful 
implementation will connect the reserves of the 
Caspian region (via trans-Caspian pipeline) to the 
European market, challenging Russia’s status as the 
main transit country for Central Asian gas. Ultimately, 
Russia suspects that Nabucco could link Iran to 
the European market in the future, jeopardizing 
Gazprom’s position on the continent.29  
To make sure that in the ‘alternative routes 
race’ Nabucco will lag behind South Stream, Moscow 
took several measures. Gazprom decided to double 
29  Danila Bochkarev, interview by author, 19 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium. 
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the capacity of South Stream, while Russian officials 
kept stressing on the (alleged) lack of a resource-
base for Nabucco. Moscow also asked the EU to 
consider South Stream as a priority project in order 
to be eligible for the Union’s funding. At the same 
time, Moscow courted Azerbaijan, the only real 
source of gas for Nabucco so far, trying to absorb 
Azerbaijani gas available for the export by paying 
the European price for it. To dissipate enthusiasm 
and breed confusion among the Nabucco stake-
holders, Russia claimed to get the ‘pre-emptive’ right 
to buy gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz offshore 
field during the second phase of development, which 
is designed to fill Nabucco (Pannier 2009). Not 
the least, the Kremlin hopes that Turkey’s difficult 
chapter in relations with the EU will at least delay the 
realization of Nabucco, if not obviating it completely.30 
The reason behind this is that Turkey might speculate 
about the EU’s interest for energy diversification to 
overcome the opposition to its membership and 
reenergize membership negotiation talks. While the 
EU is reluctant to accept such a kind of trade off, 
Moscow expects Turkey to play a spoiling game over 
Nabucco. 
 
Market liberalization and energy charter
Furthermore, the EU’s liberalization plans met a stiff 
resistance on the Russian side. Moscow perceives 
the EU’s Third Energy Package31 (in particular its 
‘reciprocity clause’) as a legal instrument that “seeks 
to contain our [i.e. Russian] justified objective to invest 
in the energy sectors of EU member states [and] to 
dictate to Russia the way in which it should regulate 
the operation of its energy companies in its domestic 
market” (Yastrzhembsky 2008: 37). Instead, the 
Kremlin would like to further expand unrestrictedly 
its presence on the European energy market, where, 
contrary to allegations about discriminatory treatment 
of Russian investors, Gazprom already holds stakes 
in more than 20 distributions, marketing or gas 
transportation companies in 16 states (Kuznetsova 
2009b). Russia’s discomfort with the EU’s 
‘reciprocity clause’ contradicts the Kremlin’s previous 
statements, which underpinned the importance of 
reciprocity in EU-Russia energy relations. However, 
it seems that the Kremlin conceives reciprocity as a 
one-way street. Moscow undermined the reciprocity 
30  Danila Bochkarev, interview by author, 19 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium. 
31  The Third Energy Package aims to further liberalize 
the internal electricity and gas market and formulates a 
framework for competition in these sectors. Among other 
provisions, package introduces ‘a reciprocity clause’ which 
requires non-EU members willing to operate on the EU market 
to comply with unbundling conditions applied to the EU 
member states. 
application in Russia by significantly restricting the 
access of foreign investors in the energy sector and 
overtaking control over mega projects previously 
administrated by foreign multinationals (for example 
Shell – Sakhalin II). 
Russia brushed away the EU’s insistent 
calls to ratify ECT and in 2009 officially informed 
the depositary of the treaty about its decision not 
to ratify the document. Moreover, it floated its own 
proposals for a new legally binding international 
agreement in the energy field showing zeal to switch 
its post-Cold War status from a ‘norm-taker’ to a 
‘norm-maker’ in the European context (Haukkala 
2008b: 54). A Russian observer underscored in this 
regard: “Everywhere we Russians are expected to 
support something without participating in creating 
it” (Pavlovsky 2009: 75). Seen in this light, the 
Russian energy initiative is partially a reaction to the 
EU’s Third Energy Package (Bochkarev 2010) that 
comes to oppose the EU’s ‘monopoly’ in formulating 
norms in the energy field (Belyi/Nappert 2009: 18). 
Paradoxically, despite the norm-making drive in this 
sector, Russia firmly believes that major energy 
deals will always be based on informal agreements 
intermediated and approved by the White House.32
While Russian proposals reiterate some 
principles enshrined in the ECT or the Third Energy 
Package, it seeks to strengthen the energy producers’ 
positions introducing an economically dubious 
principle of ‘security of demand’, which would limit 
the consumer options to choose or to change the 
supplier (Milov 2009a). A further interpretation of 
the draft also reveals Russia’s interest in having 
a say in diversification projects, facilitating the 
implementation of its own infrastructure projects, 
which face obstacles for various reasons, as well as 
providing access to the much needed know-how for 
development of its large offshore gas reserve and 
expand the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) production 
infrastructure (Russian President 2009b).
 
2.2 Craving for a ‘sphere of influence’ in the 
Euro-East
EaP still has to show its teeth
Since its launch in 2004 the ENP has been treated 
by Moscow as inconsistent, weak and lacking 
support of concrete ideas and policies.33 This 
attitude changed noticeably once the EU initiated 
the EaP in 2009 aiming to strengthen its relations 
32  Russian diplomat, interview by author, 21 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium.
33  Russian diplomat, interview by author, 6 November 
2008, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. 
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with Russia’s western and southern post-Soviet 
neighbours. It is perceived by the Kremlin as an 
initiative, which has been cooked in the laboratories 
of the unfriendly EU member states in the aftermath 
of the 2008 war in the South Caucasus (Haukkala 
2009: 6). Although previously Russia was already 
reluctant about NATO enlargement, it seems that 
the EU’s forward -looking approach towards the east 
(which grants no membership perspective so far) is 
not welcomed either (Barysch 2010: 5). While the 
Speaker of the Federation Council Sergei Mironov 
declared that “the EU should not have a separate 
eastern policy (partnership)” (Baczynska 2008), 
President Medvedev confessed that, despite the 
European representatives’ concerted effort during 
the EU-Russia summit in Khabarovsk to dissipate 
Moscow’s suspicions about this program, “they did 
not completely succeed” (Medvedev 2009c).
Behind this programme, the Kremlin detects 
an attempt to pull the rug under Russia’s feet in the 
post-Soviet space. As the Russian Foreign Minister 
bluntly put it, the EaP is ‘an attempt to extend the EU’s 
sphere of influence’ (Pop 2009), which in realpolitik 
terms takes place at the expense of others. Moscow’s 
initial harsh reaction to the EaP launch has been 
followed by a more sanguine assessment. Russian 
experts identified several hurdles on EaP’s road to 
success, ranging from post-Soviet leaders’ weak 
commitment for democracy to negative effects of 
‘frozen’ conflicts and lack of support for EaP on the part 
of the EU member states (Sergunin 2010). Thus, the 
general feeling in Moscow is that the EaP is weak and 
still has to show its teeth. At the same time, “Kremlin 
remains cautious because of the risks the EaP bear 
for Russia’s plans in the ‘near abroad”34. Thinking 
about its neighbourhood in terms of ‘exclusive love’, 
Moscow believes that the EaP may intensify or could 
set several unwelcoming developments in motion.
EaP’s potential risks for Russia
The partnership could change unfavourably the 
behaviour of Russia’s immediate neighbours. Moscow 
anticipates that irrespective of EU membership 
intentions, post-Soviet states will use the EaP to 
strengthen their bargaining power in relations with 
Moscow (Nezavisimaya Gazeta 2009). Thus, the EU’s 
initiative will boost the still asymmetric positions of the 
post-Soviet Republics to negotiate with Russia by 
presenting the alternative European offer as a refuge 
in case Russia overplays its hand as it has often done 
in the past. In this regard, Moscow’s concerns mainly 
revolve around its ally and balancer par excellence 
Belarus (Bordachev 2010: 7), which was reluctant 
34  Arkady Moshes, Programme Director – Russia in the 
Regional and Global Context, Finnish Institute for International 
Affairs, interview by author, 23 March 2010, Helsinki, Finland.
to engage in ENP before. If successful, the EaP 
support for institution- building would strengthen 
the post-Soviet states from the inside. Generally, 
Russia showed little interest in strong states on its 
periphery.35 Instead, the Kremlin manipulated their 
weak statehood to cement its influence. To attain its 
objectives, Russia quite often supported authoritarian 
governments or speculated nascent pluralism and 
dire economic conditions to challenge disloyal 
political regimes. Therefore, internally consolidated 
and institutionally solid post-Soviet neighbours would 
be a disappointing reality for Moscow. 
Although ‘unthreatening’ in financial terms 
from the Russian point of view, the EaP is expected 
to encourage a more intensive projection of the EU’s 
‘soft power’ in the eastern neighbourhood. Moscow 
is particularly preoccupied with the EU or its member 
states’ investments in the young generation and 
mass-media outlets that could speed up erosion of 
the roots of Russia’s so-called ‘geo-cultural sphere’ 
centred around Russian media, pop-culture products 
and Russian speaking minorities (Trenin 2009: 17). 
In one of its resolutions on developments in the post-
Soviet space, the Russian Duma decried the reduction 
of Russia’s information presence in the ‘near aboard’ 
over the last 15 years, warned against foreign players 
filling this space and urged the government to take 
measures to reverse this tendency (Interfax 2010). 
Other possible outcomes Russia are 
apprehensive of represent the long-term policy 
effects of the EaP. Moscow explains the initiative´s 
primary focus on ‘low politics’ with the EU’s aspiration 
to pull the post-Soviet states under its supranational 
governance in various fields (Gromoglasova 2009: 9). 
The “sectoral integration through absorption of acquis 
communautaire and free trade areas will consequently 
embed the eastern neighbours in the EU’s legal 
system and thus undermine Russia’s influence”36 as 
this process would run against Moscow´s plans to 
assemble free trade area and harmonize economic 
legislation within the CIS (Shuvalov 2010).
Moreover, the Kremlin foresees a possible 
shift on the ‘high politics’ platform, as well. Russia 
perceives the EaP as an instrument to enforce 
‘geopolitical conditionality’ that would seek to bind 
neighbours to EU positions on foreign and security 
issues. In this context, Moscow is concerned that the 
ex-Soviet states will be forced to choose between 
“either bright future with the EU, or dark past with 
Russia”37 (Chizhov 2009). The alleged EU pressure 
35  EU official, interview by author, 20 October 2009, 
Brussels, Belgium.
36  Olena Prystayko, interview by author, 19 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium.
37  Translated from Russian by author.
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on Belarus not to recognize the independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia confirms, in Russia’s 
view, its bleak forecast. Russia’s own failure in 
forcing Belarus to recognize the ‘separatist regions’ 
reconfirmed for the Kremlin the sharp competitive 
reality of the neighbourhood. 
Resistance and cooperation
Kremlin’s realpolitik mind-set breeds a discursive 
resistance to the concept of ‘common neighbourhood’, 
which is seen as the EU’s rhetoric vehicle for 
expansion to the east. A Russian diplomat remarked 
that the ‘common neighbourhood,’ as it is conceived 
in Brussels, does not exist in reality.38 It is worth 
mentioning that Russia avoids by all means referring 
to the synonym concept ‘shared neighbourhood’. This 
stems from the belief in an unambiguous division of 
the continent in a ‘non-Russian Europe’ (Karaganov 
2009) or ‘Brussels Europe’ (Ivanov 2010: 140) and 
Russia’s Europe. Such vision is best captured by 
Russia’s concept of the ‘bipolar Greater Europe’ 
according to which the EU-27 on the one hand and 
Russia including the ‘near abroad’ on the other hand, 
form two distinctive European sub-orders governed 
by supranational institutions such as the EU, the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 
the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) 
and the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan. The concept does not envision 
the existence of a rigid bipolarism on the continent 
but implies various cooperative formats between 
supranational structures (Suslov 2010; Chernyshev 
2010).
Being more than a simple theoretical 
construct developed by experts, the concept of 
‘Bipolar Greater Europe’ shapes the discourse and 
behaviour of Russian decision-makers to a large 
extent. On the eve of the EaP launch, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry warned that “such an architecture 
of EU cooperation with Russia’s neighbours should 
not come into conflict with the integration obligations 
of these countries with the CIS and the CSTO”39 
(Nezavisimaya Gazeta 2009). To legitimize its stance, 
Russian officials argued40 that under the road map 
for the common space of external security41 the 
38  Remarks by a Russian diplomat, Seminar “EU 
& Russia in the Common Neighbourhood: Competition or 
Cooperation”, October 23 2009, Brussels, Belgium. 
39  Translated from Russian by author.
40  Remarks by a Russian diplomat, Seminar “EU 
& Russia in the Common Neighbourhood: Competition or 
Cooperation”, October 23 2009, Brussels, Belgium.
41  In 2005, the EU and Russia agreed on Road maps 
for four common spaces: common economic space, common 
space of freedom, security and justice, common space on 
EU and Russia recognized each other’s integration 
process. Moreover they agreed “to actively promote 
them in a mutually beneficial manner […]” (European 
Commission 2005: 35). In case of the EaP, Moscow 
finds the EU in breach of this agreement and 
qualifies the EU policy as a “betrayal of the Russia-
EU partnership” (Bordachev 2010: 5). To remedy the 
situation, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander 
Grushko suggested that “the EU should not move 
ahead with projects in the Eastern Partnership 
that are not also the fruit of Russia-EU dialogue” 
(The Economist 2010). Thus, Russia favours the 
establishment of links between European sub-orders, 
only if these have been agreed between Moscow and 
Brussels in advance.
The vision of a ‘bipolar Greater Europe’ 
prompted Moscow to neutralize perceived risks of 
the EU regional policy in the east and to attempt to 
establish inter-institutional connections between 
Russian-led structures in the CIS with the EU. For 
instance, Moscow invested diplomatic and financial 
resources in economic integration projects (e.g. 
Customs Union) at the expense of WTO membership 
perspectives for itself and relevant partner countries. 
Russia also tried to speculate on the opportunity 
provided by the new leadership in Kiev to involve 
Ukraine in Moscow-sponsored initiatives (Putin 
2010), aimed to solidify Russia’s grip on local 
economy. In search of recognition and legitimacy, 
Russia cautiously pushed, without much success 
so far, to formalize relations between the CSTO and 
EurAsEc with the EU. Finally, Russian diplomats have 
been very active in organizing joint consultations with 
CSTO member states’ ambassadors to the EU and 
NATO to coordinate their positions.
This chapter has shown that Russia sees the EU’s 
energy and neighbourhood policies negatively. Both 
policies target fields and regions deemed by Russia 
as vital for the preservation of its great power status. 
Therefore, the Kremlin believes that the EU aims to 
weaken Russia’s position on the European energy 
market and squeeze it out of the post-Soviet region. 
This perception breeds Russia’s reactions designed to 
obstruct or dilute the effects of the EU policies. This in 
turn poisoned the bilateral atmosphere in EU-Russia 
relations. At the same time, this perception foments 
Russia’s self-assertiveness in the post-Soviet space. 
However, given the developments on the global 
energy market (expansion of LNG segment and shale 
gas ‘fever’) and the long-term tendency of the post-
Soviet states to closer engage on an economical and 
political level with other dynamic regional actors (e.g. 
the EU and China), Russia’s claims for a ‘privileged 
sphere of influence’ seem unfeasible.  
external security, common space on research, education, 
culture. See, European Commission 2005.
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3. Russian perspectives on bilateral relations 
with EU Member States
Bilateral relations with the EU member states figure 
prominently in Russia’s European agenda. This 
chapter attempts to understand how Russia sees 
the EU member states, to which purposes bilateral 
relations serve and by what kind of issues they are 
overburdened. 
3.1 Instrumentalization of bilateral relations
Russia tends to instrumentalize bilateral relations 
with EU member states to influence the EU’s foreign 
policy decisions. As the Russian former Ambassador 
to the EU argues, “Russia can (and does) influence 
the concentration of positions of EU member states 
and elaboration on the basis of their joint positions 
(fragments) on some urgent international issues” 
(Likhachev 2003: 60). However, Russia’s interests 
in the bilateralization of relations stretch far beyond 
international issues. In effect, Moscow is pursuing a 
more complex agenda. Russian experts argue that 
the Lisbon Treaty significantly boosts the powers 
of big European states and inter-governmental 
decision-making bodies, making bilateral cooperative 
tracks with them even more important than before 
(Bordachev 2009; Busygina/Filippov 2010: 127).
Russian official documents describe 
relations with several West European states as “an 
important resource for promoting Russia’s national 
interests in European and world affairs, as well 
as contributing to put the Russian economy on an 
innovative track of development” (Russian President 
2008). Yet, by delineating geographically useful 
EU member states, Russia indirectly implies the 
existence of bilateral rapports that failed to live up 
to Moscow’s expectations or, even worse, working 
against Russian objectives on the European azimuth. 
Hence, the Kremlin naturally differentiates its 
bilateral relations with EU member states. Instead of 
operating with rigid divisions, the Russian perception 
works with utility-damage criteria. Accordingly, the 
EU member states form three big clusters each one 
with its own subdivisions inside: ‘psychologically 
compatible’ partners, utilitarians and neighbours with 
the ‘phantoms of the past illness’. The EU member 
states’ assignment to one or another group is not 
permanent. Depending on bilateral dynamics, a state 
may migrate inside as well as outside of the group it 
has been nominated to in Russian mind. This paper 
seeks to draw the most recent picture of Russia’s 
perceptions of the EU member states.
3.2 ‘Psychologically Compatible’ Partners
Compatibility and political dialogue
Judging by Moscow’s attitudes, this group of 
states comprises Russia’s preferential partners in 
Western Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Spain) 
and friendly EU members from the south (Cyprus, 
Greece) with whom Moscow not only agrees on a 
wide range of issues but also shares what Russia 
defined (referring to relations with Germany, but 
applicable to all states nominated) as “cultural and 
psychological compatibility” (Volkert 2009). Beyond 
strong economic interests, Russia’s favourable 
attitude rests on reconciliation, positive historical 
experiences or religious bonds.
Russia enjoys strong political relations with 
these ‘psychologically compatible’ partners. There 
are frequent high level visits and ministerial bilateral 
contacts, which often take place within a bilateral 
inter-governmental commissions’ framework. 
These are seen as pivotal for the promotion of 
economic mega projects or the discussion of the 
most important regional and international dossiers 
affecting both states. In some cases, a regular 
political dialogue with the involvement of the business 
elite and civil society has been institutionalized. 
The Russian-German ‘Petersburg Dialogue’ which 
gathers politicians, business circles and the non-
governmental sector exemplifies the institutionalized 
multilevel dialogue. Moscow also supports a web of 
cultural and Diaspora organizations in these states 
to strengthen societal links that would support the 
bilateral political and economic agenda. 
Economic and military links
Russia’s partnerships with states from this group are 
built on a strong economic foundation. Moscow’s 
goals are double-headed: (1) generation of profits 
and (2) economic modernization. Asset swap deals 
and joint infrastructure projects dominate the energy 
cooperation agenda. Companies from Germany, 
France and Italy have been granted ‘controlled’ 
access to Russian energy development projects in 
exchange for stakes in their own downstream assets. 
Moscow hopes that the energy memorandum with 
Spain signed in 2009 will pave the way for similar 
bilateral deals (Gazprom 2009). Russia’s preferential 
partners in Western Europe are also perceived as 
the main sources for the know-how in advanced 
sectors of economy. Close partners from the south 
are economically useful, too. Greece is seen as 
an important transit terrain and final destination for 
Russia’s oil and gas new export routes. Cyprus 
serves as a financial safe heaven for Russian capital 
or host subsidiaries of Russian companies set for 
expansion in Central and Eastern Europe (Vdovin 
2007; Kupchinsky 2009). 
A high level of trust encouraged Russia to 
develop a close security and military cooperation 
with the ‘psychologically compatible’ partners. 
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Russia has concluded air military transit agreements 
to Afghanistan with Germany, France and Spain 
and expects to sign a similar accord with Italy 
(Lavrov 2009). Greece and Cyprus are among 
Russia’s traditional buyers of military hardware with 
acquisitions ranging from tanks to infantry fighting 
vehicles (RIA Novosti 2009a; Alekseev 2010). But 
military cooperation is a two-way-street process. 
Russia is geared for high-tech acquisitions or 
technology transfers to modernize its armed forces 
and increase arm exports to third countries.42 
Contentious issues
Russia’s relations with preferential partners are 
not free of sporadic economic disputes, occasional 
frosty rhetoric or mild suspicion.43 Moscow also sees 
its partners sometimes hiding behind the ‘Eastern’ 
vetoes to conceal their own dissatisfaction with 
Russian policies or decisions.44 
However, the Kremlin does believe that 
temporary obstacles on the road are unlikely to 
reverse the bilateral cooperative routine. There is 
confidence that the huge market and lucrative deals 
that the Kremlin offers to its partners (which often 
compete against each other to secure them) will 
defuse contentious bilateral issues, providing Russia 
at the same time with a stronger bargaining position. 
More than that, Moscow sensed that the global 
economic crisis exposed its privileged partners’ 
vulnerabilities and made them more amendable. 
For instance, President Medvedev underscored 
that Russia is not the only one who looks for 
investments, since Germany demonstrated a great 
deal of interest in Russia’s participation in industrial 
projects, mentioning deliberately troubled Opel and 
Wadan shipyards (Medvedev 2009d). 
42  Moscow has developed a multilateral partnership 
with French Thales which provided export versions of Russian 
made aircrafts and helicopters with advanced avionic systems, 
as well as tanks with thermal image devices. Russia also plans 
to make acquisitions for its navy. France is considered the 
frontrunner for the contract to supply the Russian navy with 
Mistral-class helicopter carriers. The Russian Ministry of 
Defence confirmed that Russia will buy armour for cars and 
light military vehicles from Germany, as domestic products 
are not providing necessary level of protection. For more see 
Naumov (2010) and Vedomosti (2010). 
43  One could think about the Lufthansa cargo hub 
row with Russia (2007), tensions over the Austrian Airlines 
(owned by Lufthansa) flying rights to Russia (2010), President 
Sarkozy’s remarks on Russia’s unconstructive behaviour on the 
international scene (2007), former German Foreign Minister 
Steinmeier’s response to the Kremlin’s threat to deploy missiles 
in the Kaliningrad region (2008).
44  Russian diplomat, interview by author, 21 October 
2009, Brussels, Belgium.
EU-Russia relations and regional dossiers
Diverse political, economic and security-military 
interconnections provide, in the Kremlin’s opinion, 
fertile ground for solving the EU-Russia problems 
on the bilateral level and to advance the dossiers 
Russia has an interest in inside the EU. For instance, 
it seems that Russia ‘cultivates’ Italy, France and 
Spain as the most active advocates in the EU of the 
visa free regime for Russian citizens (RIA Novosti 
2010; Voice of Russia 2010). Moscow worked 
closely with the Spanish EU Presidency, to receive a 
road map towards visa-free travel to Europe (Pravda 
2010). In the energy field, the Kremlin tried to make 
use of its connections in Germany and Italy in order 
to get EU funding for South Stream (Socor 2010). 
In late 2008, Russia tried to speculate France’s 
supportive attitude on President Medvedev’s 
initiative on the European Security Treaty (EST)45 to 
push for a hastily organized summit on this matter, 
while the EU has not formulated a joint approach to 
the proposal.
Apart from this, Moscow perceives these 
states as valuable channels to voice its concerns 
inside the EU or neutralize potentially negative 
decisions. Russia sees the ‘privileged partners’ 
Germany, France and Italy displaying sensitivity to 
Russian interests in the ‘near abroad’ and constantly 
demonstrating support for a greater engagement 
between the EU and Russia. Even the launch of the 
EaP, “which made some people in Moscow wonder 
why Germany has not blocked this initiative, did not 
shatter Russia’s trust in its closest European partner 
who was seen by the Kremlin working pre-emptively 
to water down the EaP”.46 Converging positions 
in the Balkans or the Black Sea region facilitates 
coordination of Russia with Cyprus and Greece 
(Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008). Cyprus’s 
instant support for President Medvedev’s initiative on 
the EST, designed by Russia to delimitate spheres of 
influence in Europe, has been much appreciated in 
Moscow (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009a). 
The balanced Spanish chairmanship of OSCE in 
2007 made Russia enlist it promptly in the group of 
fully-fledged preferential partners (Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2008), sealing it with a declaration 
on strategic partnership signed in 2009.
45  First mentioned in Berlin (2008) by President 
Medvedev, the idea of concluding a legally binding document 
in the field of European security (European Security Treaty) 
took the form of the draft prepared by the Russian diplomacy 
and made public in late 2009.
46  Arkady Moshes, Program Director – Russia in the 
Regional and Global Context, Finnish Institute for International 
Affairs, interview by author, 23 March 2010, Helsinki, Finland.
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3.3 Utilitarians
In the Russian mind, this heterogeneous group 
reunites the states from Western as well Eastern 
Europe whose relations with Moscow are not 
overburdened by ‘memory wars’ and are primarily 
driven by economic incentives. Russia distinguishes 
between apathetic utilitarians (Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Ireland, Malta, Portugal) and enthusiastic 
utilitarians (Austria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia). 
Apathetic utilitarians
The group includes states, which Russia would like 
to engage in the economic field, but Moscow’s efforts 
are not always reciprocated by practical measures or 
have a vacillating character. Russia tends to explain 
inconsistency on the part of the apathetic utilitarians 
by domestic political evolutions (crisis or elections), 
temporary inward concentration after joining the EU 
or alternative trade policy priorities. However, Russia 
often makes use of opportunities to reignite bilateral 
contacts. 
Moscow seized the moment of the 
Portuguese EU Presidency to re-launch commercial 
relations and advance its interests in relations with 
the EU (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008). The 
Russian government has been energetic in building 
commercial ties with Ireland whose investments in 
Russia grew rapidly since 2007 (Russia-InfoCentre 
2008). In 2008, Russia participated in bilateral 
diplomatic consultations in Dublin and signed with 
Ireland a programme of actions for 2008-2010 in 
the field of education, science and culture (Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009b). Maltese authorities’ 
assistance in the case of the ‘Arctic sea’ cargo vessel 
triggered Russia’s efforts to beef up commercial 
and cultural ties with Malta (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs - Malta 2009). Moscow has agreed on a joint 
plan of actions for 2010-2011 with Belgium hoping 
to infuse new dynamic in the bilateral relationship 
(Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010a). Russia 
has exercised pressure on the former enthusiastic 
utilitarian Bulgaria, which launched a review of its 
participation in the Russian-backed regional energy 
projects under its new government (EurActiv 2010). 
By acting in this manner, Moscow hopes 
to turn these apathetic into more enthusiastic 
utilitarians ensuring ultimately their, if not helpful, at 
least non-harmful stance on the EU-Russia relations 
and Russia’s interests in Europe. 
Enthusiastic utilitarians: political dialogue and 
economic links
Russia has regular political exchanges and diversified 
economic relations with the enthusiastic utilitarians. 
The volumes of bilateral trade with states from this 
group (before the economic crisis struck in 2008), 
evolved constantly along an ascending trajectory, 
the fact praised by the Russian leadership during 
bilateral meetings. The Kremlin sees behind this 
cooperative attitude of the enthusiastic utilitarians 
the need to secure uninterrupted gas or oil supplies 
and wishes to gain or assure a permanent access to 
the Russian market in order to stimulate the domestic 
export industries and financial services sectors. 
Except for the Netherlands and Luxembourg, states 
from this group cover more than 50% of their gas 
needs from Russian imports (Noel 2008: 10). The 
Kremlin is fully aware of these vulnerabilities as well 
as of the commercial incentives, and works hard 
to convert them into real economic and political 
dividends. 
Russia promotes an active economic 
diplomacy to assist its companies in securing 
lucrative deals with the enthusiastic utilitarians. The 
most intensive cooperation with the EU members 
comprising this group takes place in the energy 
sector (both gas and nuclear), where Moscow 
strives to keep and, wherever possible, boost its 
market shares. Enthusiastic utilitarians play a role 
in Russian energy diversification projects. Hoping to 
outpace the EU in the pipeline race Gazprom sealed 
Slovenia’s participation in South Stream (Bierman/
Shiryaevkaya 2009). In order to diversify support 
for North Stream, 9% of shares in the joint company 
have been offered to Dutch Gasunie (Socor 2007). 
In return, Russia generally welcomes exports, 
investments and financial services originating from 
enthusiastic utilitarians. 
Enthusiastic utilitarians: contentious issues
Despite multiple business linkages, relations 
with several enthusiastic utilitarians are not free 
of problems. Economic matters and the human 
rights agenda poison occasionally the bilateral 
atmosphere. Dutch concerns about the human 
rights violations in Russia, and the situation in 
Chechnya have constantly been an irritant factor 
for the Kremlin. The activity of a Dutch human 
rights NGO - the Russian Justice Initiative providing 
assistance to victims of violence in Chechnya - has 
been temporarily suspended by Russian authorities 
in 2006-2007 (Orttung 2007). Finland’s environment 
concerns and early allusions to consider an overland 
terrestrial route for North Stream have been received 
with annoyance in Moscow (Putin 2008). 
In such cases, Russia often applied 
economic coercion and diplomatic pressure to 
convey an unambiguous message. In 2004 and 
2007, Russia banned the import of flowers and 
plants from the Netherlands claiming phytosanitary 
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pretexts. Still raised during bilateral meetings, the 
Dutch government’s criticism on Russia’s human 
rights record has visibly subsided ever since. Since 
2007, the Russian government raised timber tax 
twice delaying further increase till the autumn of 
2009 when ‘by coincidence’ Finland, one of the major 
European importers of Russian timber, announced 
its decision on North Stream (granting ultimately 
the permission consortium needed). In each case, 
Russian officialdom was confident that the prospect 
of damaged economic relations with Russia and 
consequences to follow would force the enthusiastic 
utilitarians to find accommodation with Kremlin.
Enthusiastic utilitarians: EU-Russia relations and 
eastern neighbourhood
Russia perceives this group as unproblematic for its 
relations with the EU, most of the states supporting at 
various degrees an engagement strategy or at least 
do not raise major obstacles to it, following the course 
of European major powers. For instance, Moscow 
appreciated the efforts of the Luxembourg and the 
Slovenian EU Presidency to finalize negotiations on 
the road maps for the four common spaces and to 
start the negotiation for a new EU-Russia agreement 
(Putin 2007b, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2009a). After Russian-Finnish talks, minister Lavrov 
praised Finland’s constant support to deepen the 
EU-Russia partnership (Lavrov 2010). Moscow’s 
gratitude to Helsinki is not just rhetorical as Finland 
became the main gate to the EU for numerous 
Russian tourists, because of an efficiently applied 
visa facilitation agreement (over 700.000 visas were 
issued in 2009) (Stubb 2010). Though enthusiastic 
utilitarians develop bilateral economic relations with 
the post-Soviet states as well, Russia tends to regard 
them as unthreatening for its positions in the region 
because these generally neither target strategic 
sectors, nor critical infrastructure or jeopardize 
Russian economic interests. These states are seen 
as promoting a non-irritating approach in the eastern 
neighbourhood for Russia inside the EU. 
3.4 Neighbours suffering from ‘phantoms of the 
past illness’
Psychological gap
There is an extensive list of EU member states viewed 
in Moscow with deep suspicion. Russia believes 
that these states’ thinking on many issues is stuck 
in the past and is outdated from the perspective of 
radical political-military changes that swept across 
Europe after the Cold War. The distorted image of 
Russia based on its imperial past projected in the 
present or future, is seen at the origin of grave 
misperceptions about Russia’s domestic or foreign 
policy. In some cases, Russia sees residual colonial 
thinking behind the disfigured vision of Russia 
(Putin 2007c). Hence, the neighbours are labelled 
with ‘phantoms of the past illness’. Coined by the 
Russian ambassador to the EU (Chizhov 2009), this 
label caught accurately the Russian perception of 
Moscow’s ‘difficult’ European neighbours. The list of 
neighbours affected by this ‘syndrome’ is opened by 
the EU’s heavy-weighter UK, followed closely by the 
Baltic states, Sweden, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Romania and, to a lesser degree, Denmark. While 
lately relations with many ‘difficult’ neighbours have 
improved and consequently Russia sees them 
in a slightly positive light, it is premature to speak 
about profound changes in Russia’s perceptions 
in this regard. However, if cooperative dynamics 
continue and sensitive disputes subdue over time, 
several states from this group could migrate into the 
utilitarians category. 
Political dialogue
Generally, Russia’s bilateral political dialogue 
with the ‘difficult’ neighbours is unstable and less 
intensive than with privileged partners or enthusiastic 
utilitarians. As non-communication or very limited one 
is another way of sending foreign policy messages, 
Russia purposefully downgrades contacts or keeps 
them half-frozen for a certain period of time. In 
such circumstances, major exchanges take place 
mostly on the ministerial or parliamentary level 
and quite often on the sidelines of multilateral or 
regional meetings. During significant regional crises 
or international events, high-level dialogue occurs 
between top officials. 
There are few bilateral state visits paid by 
Moscow to ‘difficult’ neighbours. The Baltic states 
do not figure on the Russian President’s trips map, 
which serve as barometer of Russia’s attitudes 
towards these states. Furthermore, when visits take 
place (2007-2010), they are not exclusively bilateral 
and mostly linked to international events or occur in 
exceptional circumstances.47 
In turn, the Russian side is quick to extend 
invitations to Moscow when there are prospects for 
resetting relations. Sensing rhetorical and factual 
changes on governmental level towards Russia, 
Moscow welcomed the Prime-Minister from Latvia 
(2007) for the first time since the mid 1990s’, Poland 
47  Some examples confirm this approach: Romania 
(NATO Summit 2008), UK (G20 Summit 2009); Denmark 
(UN Climate Summit 2009), Russian head of state paid first, 
since 1960s, official visit to Denmark in April 2010 as relations 
warmed; Sweden (EU-Russia summit 2009), in the case of 
Stockholm the Russian side initially wanted to move the venue 
to Brussels; Czech Republic (signing ceremony of START 
between US and Russia 2010); and Poland (funeral of President 
Kaczynski 2010). In Poland’s case, Prime-Minister Putin visit 
in 2009 aimed to reciprocate his counterpart efforts to improve 
relations and strengthen those voices in Poland who support 
rapprochement. 
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(2008) after a six years pause, Denmark (2009) after 
a five years break and Sweden (2010) for the first 
time in a decade. But when the Kremlin sees that 
a state has squandered early its chance, invitations 
issued before to come to Moscow are usually 
shelved (for example Romania in 2009). 
Economic links
In spite of the frosty political atmosphere 
(spy scandals, Russia’s economic blockades, 
harassment of investors and flexing of energy 
muscles) investments and trade between the 
‘difficult neighbours’ and Russia have flourished.48 
However, from the Kremlin’s point of view even as 
Russia opened up economically, its uncomfortable 
neighbours remained extremely suspicious about 
Russian investments or projects in Europe. Until 
recently, the neighbours’ mistrust was seen mainly 
in Russia’s energy sector expansion strategy. 
Nevertheless, Russia remarks a gradual adjustment 
in how several ‘difficult’ neighbours treat the energy 
agenda. Thus, Sweden and Denmark granted 
permission to lay down the North Stream pipeline 
crossing their waters in 2009, Poland and Russia 
reached the deal on ownership of Polish chunk of 
the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. Romania, strongly 
committed to Nabucco and developed a more 
flexible attitude towards South Stream. The Russian 
leadership openly recognize a causal link between 
energy deals and improved bilateral relations (Putin 
2009b).
Contentious issues
Various political, diplomatic, historical and security 
disagreements make Russia regard this group of 
states with circumspection. Russia’s dissatisfaction 
with its ‘difficult’ neighbours is a result of what 
Russia sees as: lecturing on human rights and 
democracy; refusal to extradite political immigrants, 
extremists or shut down their website; unsettled 
border or potential territorial disputes over the Arctic; 
anti-Russian rhetoric; discrimination of Russian 
speaking minorities; politically motivated limitations 
of visa issuing; reallocation of WWII monuments to 
48  The UK is among the biggest investors in Russia, 
while Sweden’s and Denmark’s financial inflows into Russia 
significantly increased over the last years. Russia is the largest 
trade partner outside the EU for Poland, the Baltic States 
and the Czech Republic. Despite a bilateral trade deficit with 
Russia, the pace of Romania’s exports to Russia grew faster 
than Russian exports to Romania (Telegraph 2010; PAP 
Economic Bulletin 2009; Ministry of Economy of the Republic 
of Lithuania 2009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of Latvia 2010; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Estonia 2010; Rasmussen 2010: Medvedev 2009e; Churilin 
2009). 
Soviet soldiers; agreements to host elements of the 
US missile defence; attempts to bring extra-regional 
actors (code name for the US) in the Black Sea; and 
reinterpretation of history with the aim to downgrade 
Russia’s role in Europe (Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2008, 2009a, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e, 2010; 
Vzglyad 2010; Regnum 2009). 
Russia often retaliates in reaction to 
perceived hostile gestures. Besides economic 
pressure, Russian governmental agencies or 
Kremlin-friendly young movements (‘Ours’ or ‘Young 
Guard’) harassed country’s ambassadors and NGOs 
accredited in Russia (Andreev 2008; BBC 2008). 
Although very combative, the Russian stance on the 
difficult neighbours is also opportunistic. Moscow 
often seizes on positive events or favourable 
pretexts to launch a ‘charm offensive’ aimed to show 
multiple advantages of accomodationist attitudes 
towards Russia on sensitive matters. Such an 
attempt partially failed in Romania (2008-2009), but 
there are similar diplomatic campaigns underway in 
relations with Denmark and Poland, which helped 
to score some positive points for Russia (Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009f; Stratfor 2010; Moss 
2010). Moscow also periodically picks a favourite 
among the Baltic states to show an example to the 
rest and in parallel play them off against each other. 
EU-Russia relations and eastern neighbourhood
Moscow perceives ‘difficult’ neighbours as the main 
trouble makers in the EU-Russia relations. These 
states push the EU to take a harder approach 
on Russia and challenge it in the immediate 
periphery. Poland’s and Lithuania’s veto on the 
launch of negotiations on a new EU-Russia accord, 
overwhelming negative reaction of these states 
(primarily UK, Sweden, Baltic states, Poland) to 
Russia’s ‘enforcement of peace’ in Georgia, as well 
as the Eastern Partnership initiated by Poland and 
Sweden have been interpreted by the Kremlin in 
this light. Russia has also shown discontent with its 
‘difficult’ partners tutoring the post-Soviet neighbours 
on their way towards the EU. Not surprisingly, 
Moscow assessed pessimistically the Czech and 
Swedish Presidency of the EU (2009) both seen 
injecting more competition in EU-Russia relations 
(Bordachev 2010: 5). 
In order to neutralize the spoiling behaviour 
of ‘difficult’ neighbours Moscow acts to isolate 
them inside the EU. Portraying them as frustrated 
states, which keep the EU-Russia relationship a 
hostage of their bilateral misunderstandings with 
Russia, Moscow strived via bilateral channels to 
dilute solidarity inside the EU. In the middle of the 
meat ban dispute with Poland, Moscow offered 
several EU member states (among others Italy and 
Germany) to sign bilateral agreements that would 
guarantee the access of their meat products to the 
Russian market. Besides the bilateral track, Russia 
often raised issues related to ‘difficult’ neighbours’ 
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behaviour at EU-Russia summits, while reassuring 
the EU leadership that the Russian side is ready for 
both open dialogue and cooperation. For instance, 
Russia’s Presidential Aide Sergei Prihodko, ahead 
of the EU-Russia summit in Khabarovsk (2009) 
declared that Russia would raise “questions of the 
EU responsibility for foreign policy of its member 
states which violate common standards”49 targeting 
Romania for alleged involvement in orchestrating 
post-electoral violence in Moldova in this case (RIA 
Novosti 2009b). 
This chapter has depicted the most recent 
snapshot of Russia’s perceptions of the EU member 
states. It has reconfirmed that bilateralism remains 
at the core of Russia’s European policy. It has also 
shown that when Russia looks at the EU members, it 
distinguishes between the most preferential partners, 
utilitarians and ‘uncomfortable’ neighbours. Moscow 
relies mainly on ‘psychologically compatible’ partners 
and utilitarians to advance its European agenda. 
However, Russia’s divide and rule strategy often 
provoked tensions and widened the gulf of mistrust 
between the EU and Russia. This in turn pushed the 
EU to seek a common approach towards Russia 
raising a question mark over sustainability and 
deliverables of Kremlin’s ‘great power bilateralism’.
49  Translated by author from Russian.
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Conclusions
 
This study aimed to make a detailed radiography 
of Russia’s perceptions of the EU and to provide a 
better understanding of Russia’s motivations in its 
relations with Europe. The following conclusions 
present a detailed summary of the main findings, 
critically reflect Russia’s mainstream perceptions of 
the EU and lay down preconditions for a successful 
EU policy towards Russia.    
The first chapter unveiled Russia’s 
multilayered and often conflicting attitudes towards 
the internal and the external dimension of the EU 
integration project. It found that from the Russian 
perspective the EU enlargement complicated 
decision-making processes in the EU and 
apparently put on hold the European project, while 
the severe economic crisis dispelled an image of 
EU’s invulnerability. Russia’s views are influenced 
by what the Kremlin sees as encouraging domestic 
developments and a favourable international 
context: the political regime escaped the economic 
crisis relatively unscathed, preserving a strong grip 
on power; the economic recovery proceeds at a 
satisfactory pace; oil prices have stabilized and are 
likely to jump in the future. This chapter also showed 
that Russia’s self-confidence is accompanied by a 
growing demand for modernization, a process in 
which the EU has an important role to play. However, 
Russia aspires to modernize itself without ceding an 
inch of sovereignty to the EU. The Kremlin hopes to 
conduct modernization, understood as absorption of 
Western technologies, without political liberalization. 
Russia believes that the Asian track – in particular the 
relationship with China – could provide more space 
for manoeuvre with the EU and deliver tangible 
benefits in terms of modernization. It seems that 
Moscow ignores incompatibility of these aspirations, 
which could lead to quite the opposite of what Russia 
intends. Without political liberalization, estrangement 
between Russia and the EU will widen. At the same 
time, greater economic engagement between 
a structurally unreformed Russia and a rapidly 
developing China will accentuate the asymmetry 
between the neighbours, in favour of the latter. Thus, 
‘sovereign great power’ ambitions are likely to keep 
Russia in a resource-based economy trap unless the 
Kremlin fundamentally revises its approach towards 
modernization and model of the economic interaction 
with the EU. The first chapter also discovered that 
the Kremlin tries to channel the bulk of hegemonic 
energies and aspirations through institution-building 
in the post-Soviet world under a multilateral label. On 
surface, the EU serves for Russia as an example. But 
at a closer look, Russia’s integration projects in the 
CIS are merely a hollow imitation of the EU model. 
Russia – a modern project under construction – is 
neither mentally nor structurally ready to promote 
a post-modern enterprise in its periphery. The 
Kremlin utilizes the European integration language 
and forms stripped off the European substance. 
Explaining this situation, one expert noted: “Russian 
elites cling tightly to the country’s sovereignty, use 
coercive methods to induce post-Soviet fellows to 
join supranational bodies, and aim for a relationship 
in which Russia plays the dominant role.”50 Thus, 
Moscow-sponsored initiatives reject a consensual 
integration philosophy, contradicting the European 
integration spirit from the outset. At the same time, 
Russia’s bravado about fast-track integration seems 
to disregard the EU project’s non-linear history 
of development, which required a good dose of 
‘strategic patience’.
This chapter also highlighted Russia’s 
sceptical stance about prospects of EU’s 
transformation into an autonomous security and 
military actor unless Europe’s current defence 
spending will rise. This critical view is reinforced by 
Russia’s efforts to invest, with mixed results so far, in 
the modernization of its own armed forces, reflected 
in consecutive defence budget increases since 
2000. Russia’s decision-makers´ deeply engrained 
respect for the ‘military muscle’, seen as gaining 
more relevance in times of world order transition, 
also contributes to Russia’s pessimism. However, a 
closer look reveals that Russia’s attitudes towards 
CSDP are contradictory. On the one hand, Russia 
welcomes CSDP, which would develop at the 
expense of NATO, and inclines to encourage this 
process. On the other hand, Russia worries that a 
better articulated CSDP would challenge its positions 
in the post-Soviet space. These concerns are able 
to explain the Kremlin’s effort to sabotage CSDP 
missions in the region, which ultimately undermines 
the EU’s attempt to foster an effective CSDP. The 
chapter also unveiled that Russia regards the 
EU’s foreign policy performance critically. Russia’s 
thinking about the EU’s foreign policy-making is 
heavily influenced by its own perspective on how 
efficient decision-making mechanisms ought to 
look like. Thus, it is not surprising that the executive 
power, which has a ‘blank check’ from Parliament 
to use military force abroad51 when considered 
‘necessary’, regards the foreign policy making in the 
EU as extremely slow and unnecessarily lengthy. 
This chapter presented two areas where 
the EU is seen by Moscow as a highly competitive 
player (mediation of conflicts and environment) 
using a tool (‘soft power’), which yields at greater 
50  Susan Stewart, Senior research associate, German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs, interview by 
author, 25 March 2010, Berlin, Germany.
51  In December 2009, the Russian Upper House voted 
a resolution which endows Russian President to deploy armed 
forces abroad without consultation and approval of the Federal 
Council. For more details, see Felgenhauer (2009).
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influence in the neighbourhood. This perception 
exposed to Russia what it has not itself. As a result, 
this understanding fuelled the Kremlin’s cautious 
involvement in global ecological diplomacy and 
inspired a ‘soft power’ discourse in the ‘near abroad’. 
Seen in this light, Russia’s ecological diplomacy is 
driven by great power ambitions rather than by 
domestic environment concerns. Russia’s ‘soft 
power’ discourse, which underscores continuity 
between the common past and the future, aims to 
bolster legitimacy of institutional engineering in the 
post-Soviet space under the Kremlin’s patronage. 
This chapter also revealed Russia’s aversion to 
the EU as an institution, which sets the normative 
standards for overall ‘Europe’. Finally the chapter 
disclosed Russia’s predilection for the ‘great power 
bilateralism’, essential for Kremlin’s contradictory 
aspirations to divide and unite the EU on foreign 
policy dossiers. Russia interprets the EU’s low 
standing in US key priorities and trans-Atlantic 
divergences, ranging from response to the global 
economic crisis up to the strategy in Afghanistan, 
as providing the Kremlin with opportunities to pull 
Europe closer to Russia within the ‘Russia-US-EU’ 
triangle.
The second chapter aimed to examine 
Russia’s attitudes and reactions to European energy 
(with a special focus on gas) and neighbourhood 
policies (EaP). These views also constitute  Russia’s 
inflated ambitions in the post-Soviet region, suspicion 
and misunderstandings in relations with the EU. The 
chapter showed that Moscow perceives Europe’s gas 
policy aiming primarily to lessen EU’s dependence 
on gas deliveries from Russia. The Kremlin thinks 
that, if successful, (1) European policy will weaken 
Russia’s overall negotiating position with the EU, (2) 
challenge its grip on energy resources in the Caspian 
region and (3) reduce Gazprom’s market share in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Although the Russian 
leadership has been increasingly loud about plans to 
build up an innovative economy, Russia is still very 
much entrapped in the ‘energy superpower’ logic. 
Energy remains the key tool of the Russian foreign 
policy. Thus, realpolitik, which guides Russia’s 
energy policy, often overshadows profit rationales. 
This rationale is contradictory to the official line, 
which speaks about an exclusively commercial 
nature of Gazprom’s projects. For instance, exports 
to the EU via South Stream are likely to shrink 
Russian gas monopoly revenues as the transit fee 
will be almost three times higher than the Russian 
monopoly pays for the transit route via Ukraine. The 
example of the South Stream pipeline demonstrates 
Russia’s intention to neutralize Ukraine’s gas transit 
lever employed in the past to withstand the Kremlin’s 
economic and political pressure.  
This chapter also exposed Russia’s duplicity 
in energy relations with Europe. It pointed to 
Russia’s declarative support for reciprocity in energy 
deals on the one hand, and Russian legislation, 
which significantly restricts foreign investments 
in the energy sector on the other hand. Finally 
this chapter unveiled Russia’s aversion towards 
liberalization, transparency and greater competition 
on the gas market, which is envisioned by the EU’s 
Third Energy Package. This comes at no surprise, 
as Gazprom is structurally unfit to compete on the 
‘buyers market’ (Milov 2009b). The inclusion of the 
‘security of demand’ principle in Russia’s energy 
proposals derives from Gazprom’s vulnerabilities, 
confirmed during the economic crisis. Data for 2008-
2010 vividly illustrate that Russia’s competitors on 
the world gas market – Norway, Qatar and Libya – 
boosted sales of gas to Europe, while Gazprom’s 
share on the European market dramatically dropped 
(Grib 2010). Thus, contrary to Russia’s unsustainable 
gas policy, the ratification of the ECT coupled with 
the reform of Gazprom could be the best recipe to 
secure Russia’s long-term interest in Europe. 
Furthermore, this chapter illustrated that 
Moscow thinks about the ‘common neighbourhood’ 
with the EU in zero-sum terms. Thus, this logic does 
not confine exclusively to the NATO expansion to 
the east as it was widely assumed. In the Russian 
reading, the EaP is an attempt to spread Western 
influence in the post-Soviet space by other means. It 
also showed that Russia did not come fully to terms 
with the fact that the ‘near abroad’ is not and cannot 
be its own sphere of privileged interests. Russia’s 
exaggerated assumptions about its economic weight 
in the region as well as the perceived competition 
with the EU in the eastern neighbourhood fuelled 
unsustainable ambitions. A preliminary assessment 
of the effects of the global financial crisis indicates that 
the post-Soviet neighbours’ recovery increasingly 
depends on the EU and China (market and financial 
assistance both bilaterally or channelled via IMF), 
while Russia’s role appears to shrink gradually. This 
does not only undermine Russia’s ability to convince 
its aspired partners, but also to act as an economic 
integration engine in the post-Soviet space.  
A critical glimpse at Russia’s EaP 
perceptions unveiled Moscow’s preoccupation with 
the construction of supranational structures and little 
interest to support nation-building in the post-Soviet 
space. However, Russian officialdom claims to play 
a role in deciding on the level of interaction between 
the EaP states and the EU, proves Russia’s fear 
that the post-Soviet neighbours would foster a more 
advanced relationship with the EU than Russia will 
do in future. Instead, views emanating from Moscow 
confirm that Russia would prefer the post-Soviet 
states’ cooperation with the EU to be a hostage of 
the bumpy relationship between the EU and Russia. 
The third chapter dealt with Russia’s 
perception of the EU member states. It showed 
that Russia sees bilateralism as the best way to 
promote its multidimensional European agenda with 
the EU. From a Russian perspective this strategy 
has yield palpable results. Moscow was able to 
‘seduce’ Europeans with attractive business offers 
converting economic interests in political influence. 
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The Kremlin is also confident that it induced respect 
among almost all ‘difficult neighbors’ for its interests 
in the post-Soviet region. Moscow anticipates that 
the most stubborn ones will follow what it sees as 
‘Polish pragmatism’; it would be only a matter of 
time. Otherwise, they have no choice other than to 
gain irrelevance, as the Lisbon Treaty, in the Russian 
eyes, empowers larger European powers, which 
can easily overthrow any anti-Russian coalition 
inside the EU. Russia’s ‘great power bilateralism’ 
also shows that the Kremlin sees Europe in terms of 
nation states. 
While bilateralism has rendered results, it 
also exposed limits. Despite Moscow’s energetic 
lobby in European capitals to conclude the EU-Russia 
visa-free agreement, Germany made clear that visa 
liberalization will neither come quickly, nor without 
hard work (Merkel 2010). When a member state 
has been cornered by Russia, the EU (sometimes 
reluctantly) exercised solidarity. After the Russian-
Georgian war the debate on Russia inside the EU 
become less polarized. There is strong sense that 
Russia should be engaged, but at the same time, 
some red lines of what is not acceptable should 
be drawn (Stelzenmüller 2010: 6). At the same 
time, European heavyweighters tend to broaden 
coalitions inside the EU on Russian related matters, 
bringing on board the member states with strong 
regional interests in the eastern neighbourhood and 
significant number of votes in the Council of the 
European Union (e.g. Poland, Romania). In addition, 
given the EU’s efforts to streamline its foreign policy 
through a new diplomatic apparatus, Russia is likely 
to face a more coherent EU on the international 
stage than before. Russia also seems to ignore the 
European Parliament proclivity to gain a bigger say 
in EU’s foreign policy matters (e.g. involvement in 
setting up of the European External Action Service) 
and its co-decision powers on visa policy. In these 
circumstances, bilateralism alone will not be enough 
to advance Russia’s agenda in Europe. Therefore, 
without active engagement with the EU institutions 
Russia’s European policy is likely to hit a wall. 
What do Russia’s perceptions mean for the EU? 
From Moscow’s vantage point, an approach which 
rests on cold calculations and bilateralism would 
pave the way for a genuine and value-free ‘strategic 
partnership’ between the two major European poles. 
However, this logic again advocates drawing lines 
in Europe, a perspective running against the EU’s 
integration philosophy, the implementation of which 
made the reconciliation of the long time bitter rivals 
possible. Russia’s foreign policy stance is set to 
outlive the economic turbulences. The EU is unlikely 
to give up on its values as well. The challenge the EU 
will face in the years to come on the eastern azimuth 
is to devise and implement a smart strategy that 
would effectively neutralize Russia’s paternalistic 
view of Europe and at the same time engage Russia 
whenever it is willing to step in a broad cooperative 
framework which would make the best of the EU’s 
transformative power. 
The task is not an easy one given the image 
Russia holds about the EU. The key to success lies 
in Europe’s ability to coagulate a large functional 
consensus on Russia-related issues on the inside, 
develop synergies between bilateralism and jointly 
agreed policies on Russia as well as promote a 
neighbourhood policy, which besides offering long-
term rewards helps to tackle urgent economic 
problems and vital security concerns of the post-
Soviet states. The EU’s eastern policy could benefit 
from post-Lisbon institutional innovations in the 
foreign policy field. The EU, dealing successfully with 
domestic challenges and demonstrating leadership 
on the global stage, might amend favourably 
Russia’s perception of the EU. A combination of all 
these aspects could ultimately pave the way for an 
atmosphere in the EU-Russia relations conducive to 
sustainable cooperation.    
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